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Introduction 
 
This paper is a case study of the Shallow Natural Gas Leasing Program in the state of 
Alaska.  Created originally by the Alaska Legislature in 1996 as a way to make it easier 
and cheaper to tap natural gas reserves in remote rural areas, the program went largely 
unnoticed until 2003 when companies applied for more than 250,000 acres of shallow gas 
leases in populated areas of the state around the Mat-Su Valley and Homer. The public 
policy controversy which followed over the development of coalbed methane reserves is 
analyzed using a common-interest-tragedies framework.    
 
Below the tragedies of the commons and anticommons are reviewed to generate insights 
which may help us understand the state of Alaska’s approach to managing oil and gas 
resources.  This is followed by a description of how since statehood in 1959, Alaska has 
acted as an owner-state in managing the Alaska commons for oil and natural gas.   The 
idea that governments may manage the commons by creating an anticommons is then 
introduced and applied to Alaska.    The Alaska anticommons obstacles inherent in the 
conventional Five-year Leasing Program for Oil and Gas are described and contrasted 
with the Shallow Natural Gas Leasing Program.   The eventual repeal and amendment of 
the Shallow Natural Gas Leasing Program is shown to be the result of controversy 
created by the Alaska Legislature when in designing the new program it took rights of 
exclusion out of the anticommons.   The non-competitive Shallow Gas Leasing Program 
did not include the conventional public hearing process used to determine an official 
“best-interest finding” by the Alaska Department of Natural Resources and also 
preempted local planning and zoning ordinances.   
 
 
The Common-Interest-Tragedies Framework 
 
Hardin (1968) defined the “Tragedy of the Commons” as the situation where too many 
owners of a common resource, each having the right to use, eventually leads to overuse.  
Unlimited access to the commons either exhausts the resource -- as users take something 
out of the commons (e.g. fish, oil )  or pollutes the resource -- as users put something foul 
into the commons ( e.g. sewage, noxious fumes) .   Heller (1998) introduced the idea of 
the “Tragedy of the Anticommons” as occurring where multiple owners, each having the 
right to exclude others from the resource, leads to underuse of the resource since no 
single user can use the whole.  Heller’s inspiration of the idea of the anticommons came 
from his observations during the early post Soviet period that many Moscow storefronts 
were empty, while the street kiosks in front were full of goods.  He suggested that it was 
because the transition regime in Russia failed to endow any individual with full 
ownership of these scarce storefront resources.  Rights to the storefront resources were 
distributed among many stakeholders-giving some the right to sell, another the right to 
receive revenue, and others the right to lease, occupy and determine use.  Each “owner” 
was able to block the others from using the store.  
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The tragedies of the commons and the anticommons were shown by Buchanan & Yoon 
(2000) to display a structural symmetry (see Appendix I).  While the tragedy of the 
commons results in overuse of a resource, the tragedy of the anticommons is the underuse 
of a resource. The symmetry is found in the basic logic of the two cases.  The tragedy-of- 
the-commons problem emerges as more than a single person or agent is assigned usage 
rights for a common property. Multiple owners are given the right to use a particular 
resource but no one has the right to exclude other.  Conversely, the tragedy-of-the- 
anticommons problem arises when more than one person is assigned and simultaneously 
exercises the rights to exclude other from using the property.    Anticommons property is 
the mirror image of common property because multiple owners have the right to exclude 
others from using a scarce resource, so no one has an effective right to use the resource.  
 
While the tragedies of the commons and the anticommons display structural symmetry, 
their solutions are the same.  The solution to the commons problem has long been 
recognized to be the creation of private property rights (Munzer, 2005).  Hardin’s 
(1968:1247) call for social arrangements that produce responsibility through “mutual 
coercion mutually agreed upon” recognizes the institution of private property as a 
preferable alternative to the horrors of the commons.  Similarly, Heller’s (1998) study of 
the transition predicament which post Soviet economies faced depicted an anticommons 
created by a socialist legal system that lacked a sense of private property.  The state 
owned all the land, indivisibly with no right of alienation.  Various negotiating 
mechanisms were used to settle conflicts over use.  Property reflected a complex 
hierarchy of divided and coordinated rights.  The government’s attempt to satisfy all 
rights holders in the move to private property resulted in the misuse of resources like the 
Moscow storefronts.  
 
 
 
Because  the symmetry of the these common interest tragedies points to a private 
property solution,  the tragedies of the commons and the anticommons are not necessarily 
diametric opposites, but may actually converge (Fennell, 2004)  In reality,  potential 
anticommons problems may underlie every  response to a commons dilemma.  This may 
happen when the attempt to solve the tragedy of the commons through an overly 
“propertized” or “privatized”   response creates what Heller (1998) refers to as a spatial 
anticommons where the subdivision of the space results in inefficiently fragmented 
property.   Also, as Heller explains, anticommons problems may result from the creation 
of a legal anticommons where legal or de facto veto rights over resource use are handed 
out to too many owners (see Appendix II). 
 
Within the context of the common-interest tragedies described above,  the analytic 
framework used to present the case study of Alaska’s Shallow Natural Gas program is 
inspired from Heller’s (1999) work delineating the boundaries of private property in 
relation to the commons and anticommons ( see figure 1) 
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Source:  Michael A. Heller. 1999.  The Boundaries of Private Property.  The Yale Law 
Journal; 108, 6; ABI/INFORM Global pg. 1163 
 
 
According to Heller, commons property can be arrayed along continuum from open 
access to limited access (on left side of figure 1).  The common/private boundary defines 
a limited-access commons where the owners A and B can each use a resource, but neither 
can exclude the other, nor can either exclude outsiders.  Conversely, anticommons 
property can be depicted along a continuum from full exclusion to limited exclusion (on 
right side of figure 1).  The anticommons/private boundary defines a limited-exclusion 
anticommons where owners A and B can block each other from using a resource, holding 
it in an anticommons form vis-à-vis each other, but as private property vis-à-vis the rest 
of the world.   
 
The notion developed in this case study of the Alaska Shallow Natural Gas program is 
that managers faced with avoiding tragedies of the commons and anticommons  must 
solve dilemmas respectively  constrained by commons/private  and anticommons/private 
boundaries.   In a limited-access commons, internal governance rules have to be 
established to limit the scale of resource use so as to avoid a tragedy of the commons. On 
the other hand, in  a limited exclusion anticommons, efforts must be made to reach out to 
those who can’t agree to use a resource so that at least they can be compensated if a 
regulation abolishes their rights to exclude.   
 
The case study of Alaska’s Shallow Natural Gas program which follows begins with a 
short historical overview of the development of Alaska’s conventional oil and gas 
resources which sets the stage for understanding the recent controversy over the 
development of Alaska’s unconventional shallow natural gas (coal bed methane).   First, 
the Alaska Commons for subsurface mineral resources which was created at statehood in 
1959 is described.  Why the management regime set up to develop oil and natural gas – 
the Alaska Owner State – eventually placed these resources in the anticommons is 
explained.   
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Managing the Commons/Private Boundary: The Alaska 
Owner State  
 
The Alaska Statehood Act of 1959, allowed the state of Alaska to select 104 million acres 
(about the size of the state of California) from the federal public domain.  In 1920, the 
Minerals Leasing Act had separated subsurface mineral rights from the surface rights to 
land. The Alaska Statehood Act passed this split-estate rule on to the state lands. Property 
rights to the all the minerals under state lands were granted to the state of Alaska.  The 
state was required to keep the subsurface rights even if the surface rights were sold.   The 
state’s mineral estate would be forfeited to the federal government if the state ever failed 
to hold onto its mineral interests.   
 
The Alaska Constitution established the framework for the state to exercise its ownership 
of the vast subsurface commons.  Article VIII, section 1 states that it “is the policy of the 
State to encourage the settlement of its land and the development of its resources by 
making them available for maximum use consistent with the public interest.” 
 
The unique role that Alaska plays in managing its subsurface resources has been 
characterized by former Alaska Governor Walter Hickel (2000)   as an “owner state” 
solution.  In the owner state, the traditional form of frontier development – the disposal of 
the commons -- is not pursued.  Unlike the Wild-West-land-disposition approach, in the 
Alaska Last Frontier the state maintains ownership of the resources and oversees their 
development.     
 
The philosophy of the owner state is influenced by the struggles Alaska had with both the 
federal government and big business prior to statehood.  As Congressional Delegate Bob 
Bartlett remarked at the opening of the Statehood Convention in Fairbanks in 1955 there 
were real dangers facing the young state:  “The first, and most obvious, danger is that of 
exploitation under the thin guise of development ….  The second danger is that outside 
interests, determined to stifle any development in Alaska which might compete with their 
activities elsewhere, will attempt to acquire great areas of Alaska in order not to develop 
them until such time as, in their omnipotence and the pursuance of their own interest, 
they see fit.” 
 
The first danger of resource exploitation is a tragedy-of-the-commons problem.  Taking 
Alaska’s natural resources without regard to the collective consequences results in 
overuse and leaves the people of the state with little or nothing to support governmental 
services.   The second danger of stifled resource development was viewed at the time as a 
problem of market failure --an argument about monopsony.  Resource producers would 
hold back production from Alaska to increase profits on resource production in other 
areas of the globe.  Today, a more contemporary Alaskan interpretation would be to look 
at the phenomenon of resource underuse as a tragedy-of-the-anticommons problem 
resulting from actions of environmentalist and the federal government to veto 
development and keep the state locked up in parklands.   
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The Alaska Owner State solution for avoiding the tragedy of the commons and promoting 
the development of Alaska’s resources has the following essential elements. 
 
1.  State Ownership.  The Alaska Constitution gives ownership of the commons to the 
state.  It requires that the state exercise leadership and foster economic development 
of the natural resource base.  State ownership of the commons also means that 
resource rents instead of taxes will be used to provide public services to the citizenry  
2.  Constitutional Democracy.  In the owner state leaders are accountable to residents of 
the state.  Poor performance in managing the commons can result in loss of elected 
office.  This democratic framework also stipulates that the commons needs to be 
locally controlled so that opportunities and problems associated with local resource 
production can be deal with efficiently. 
3.  Privatization.  The wealth of the commons is developed by the private sector.  The 
efficiency and initiative of the private sector is used to produce resources and 
maximize the return to owners.  Government’s role is to provide access and resource 
polices and contracts which guide development. 
 
The Owner State Model is the traditional model of public administration whereby the 
citizens drive and direct a hierarchically organized government.  At the top of the 
hierarchy is the governor of the owner state acting like a ranch foreman responsible for 
seeing that resources are used in their best way.  The best way may sometimes be 
conservation, but the governor also actively promotes and pursues development.  The 
governor’s job includes forging contracts with private business for development 
purposes.  The owner state requires good leadership and a strong support staff that can 
help negotiate and monitor contracts.   
 
When Alaska became a state in 1959, Governor Egan told his resources commissioner 
Phil Holdsworth to begin the competitive sales of oil and gas leases as quickly as 
possible.    “The new state government needed the money, and the oil companies were 
eager to spend it” (Roderick, 1997:111-120).  During the fifteen year period 1959-1973, 
the state sold twenty-eight oil and gas leases in Cook Inlet, the Alaska Peninsula, and the 
North Slope to the oil companies without much controversy and generated significant 
revenue for the state.  For example, the discovery of oil in Prudhoe Bay in 1968 was 
followed by a record breaking $900 million sale for a North Slope lease.   However, by 
1973 events unfolded which represented a major turning point in state competitive lease 
sales.    
 
In 1973, Governor Egan proposed a competitive lease sale in lower Cook Inlet which 
included large tracts within outer Kachemak Bay in the Kenai Peninsula near the small 
fishing town of Homer. The citizens of Homer became enraged at the prospect of oil and 
gas development ruining their fishing livelihood.   Although the citizens’ cries of protest 
and petitions were unsuccessful in stopping the lease sale, the issue helped propel the 
next Governor, Jay Hammond, into office with a promise to choose fish over oil and a 
pledge to get the state to buy back the oil leases.  As a result of the Kachemak Bay 
controversy, no longer could a Governor, acting as the ranch foreman of the Owner State, 
“sell leases to the oil companies without any real reflection on the environmental impact   6
of the sale, simply for the purpose of gaining immediate revenue to run government 
(Flagg, 2005).”   The era of the Alaska anticommons for oil & natural gas had begun. 
 
The Kachemak Bay controversy marks the Owner State’s transition from managing 
limited–access commons property using single lease sales to managing limited-exclusion 
anticommons property through Best Interest Finding determinations.   Rather than 
making deals with oil and gas producers on behalf of the shareholders of the Owner State, 
the management focus shifted toward meeting the demands of stakeholders who might 
block development of oil and gas resources.   
 
Managing the Anticommons/Private Boundary:  
Conventional Oil & Gas Leasing  
 
That the foreman of the owner state ranch could not  unilaterally act alone as the sole 
proprietor controlling the commons should have come as no surprise given the myriad of 
different interests that began to lay claim to the subsurface mineral commons e.g.  federal 
agencies, industry, local communities, environmental organizations and the public.  A 
more complex administrative process was now required to manage the Alaska subsurface 
commons for oil and natural gas.  Paradoxically, the rules and regulations promulgated 
by the Owner State for leasing the land for which it holds the subsurface estate, created a 
legal anticommons.   Best Interest Finding (BIF) determinations were required to be 
written before lease sales could be held.   The BIF findings were based on extensive 
analyses of social economic, environmental, geological, and geophysical information 
about the tract or sale.   In 1994, the BIF process was extended and elaborated even 
further to require the Alaska Department of Natural Resources (ADNR) to issue 
preliminary findings in addition to final findings, with two months allowed for public 
comment on the preliminary findings.    
 
The Best Interest Finding process administered by ADNR’s Division of Oil and Gas 
extended “rights of exclusion” to the public which didn’t exist in the early years of state 
competitive lease sales.   Moreover,   the burden of managing the oil and gas 
anticommons proved to be significant as each new lease sale now required its own  
preliminary and final Best Interest Finding.  Efforts were then made to contain rising 
administrative and decision-making costs. In 1996 the duration of a Best Interest Finding 
was extended from five to ten years.   Also, ADNR changed the way it conducted 
competitive lease sales by shifting from single lease to areawide lease sales in 1998.    
 
Under the   single lease sale approach, the state offered areas for sale based on 
nominations from industry (Alaska Department of Natural Resources, 2000:100).   The 
areas to be leased were noncontiguous patchwork portions of a region which had to be 
separately evaluated by the Alaska Department of Natural Resources (ADNR).  Often, 
the ADNR was required to repeat this comprehensive evaluation exercise for other 
patchwork portions which were frequently adjacent to those in the same region.  The state 
incurred high decision-making costs as it was repeatedly analyzing resources and issues 
that were identical to those it just analyzed.   The cost of decision-making to the public   7
was also high as the public was asked to repeatedly comment on areas with similar 
resources, issues and concerns.    
 
In 1998, the state overcame this administrative burden by shifting to areawide lease sales.  
There is no longer a need for industry nominations since areawide leasing includes all 
available state acreage within each geographic region.  Areawide sales are now held each 
year for all proposed lease sales.  All available state acreage within a geographic region is 
included.  The adoption of areawide leasing reduces redundant Best Interest Finding 
determinations by ADNR which were previously required under the single lease program 
each time a lease was offered for the bidding process.  The Areawide Leasing program 
makes the BIF process more cost effective by allowing a BIF to be written for the entire 
area.  No longer is it required to solicit public comments on the inclusion of each tract of 
land in a proposed sale area.  Once a BIF has been written for an areawide sale, ADNR 
can conduct a lease sale in that same area each year for up to ten years without having to 
repeat the entire BIF process.  Previously, a BIF was good for only five years 
 
Areawide lease sales have been traditionally held in four geographic regions: the North 
Slope; North Slope Foothills; Beaufort Sea; and Cook Inlet.  Beginning in 2005, the state 
added areawide sales on the Alaska Peninsula located in Southwest Alaska (see Appendix 
III).  The shift to areawide leasing allows businesses to plan ahead by providing a 
predictable schedule of annual lease sales which is intended to keep Alaska attractive to 
investors and competitive in the global marketplace. 
 
Area-leasing coupled with Best Interest Finding determinations have proven to effective 
mechanisms for managing the limited-exclusion anticommons for conventional oil and 
gas resources.   Areawide leasing helps control costs, while the Best Interest Finding 
process alerts managers to potential conflicts with stakeholders which must be resolved 
before development of conventional oil and gas resources can occur.  However, when the 
legislature acted to establish a program to develop unconventional shallow gas,  the 
policy arena shifted back to where it was in 1959 at the beginning of Alaska statehood.  
The lure of state royalties from coal-bed methane production resulted in the creation of a 
non-competitive shallow gas leasing program better suited for managing a limited-access 
commons than a limited-exclusion anticommons.   
The Limited-Access Commons for Shallow Natural Gas 
 
In 1996, the Alaska Legislature created the Shallow Natural Gas (SNG) leasing program 
(AS38.05.177) outside of the legal anticommons which governed conventional deep hole 
drilling for oil and gas.  Faced with projections of a growing fiscal gap in the state’s 
budget, legislators viewed the potential royalties from   SNG production as an important 
new source of state revenue and pushed forward with the development of SNG.  The new 
SNG program allowed shallow gas drillers to bypass regulations which applied to the 
Conventional Oil and Gas leasing program.  In 2000, when the SNG program began to be 
implemented, it became apparent that legal anticommons obstacles would not get in the 
way of shallow natural gas exploration, licensing and drilling in Alaska.   
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The newly created SNG program was a non-competitive over-the-counter leasing 
program.  The over-the-counter aspects pf the SNG program avoided anticommons 
obstacles by “privatizing” the letting of leases and extinguishing excluders’ rights.   For a 
mere $5,000 application fee, producers were allowed to choose the land they wanted to 
lease.    The ADNR Division of Oil & Gas was authorized to issue a three-year non-
competitive lease to explore as much as 5,760 acres (9 sq. miles) to develop natural gas 
located within 3,000 feet of the surface.  .  Furthermore, the rights of the general public 
and local government to review and comment on the sale of leases were eliminated by the 
new SNG program.   
 
First of all, the SNG leases sales were exempted from a best interest finding (BIF).   The 
ADNR would approve the producers lease selections if the Director of the ADNR 
determined that the discovery of a local source of natural gas would “benefit the residents 
of an area.”  Because practically all applications could be shown to benefit the residents 
of an area, the ADNR had little authority to reject an application.  The result was that the 
public’s right to exclude leases for sale based on a best interest finding was extinguished 
by the Shallow Natural Gas leasing program.  
 
 Secondly, in 2003 the SNG leasing program was amended by the Alaska legislature (HB 
69) to limit local government control over shallow gas exploration and development.  The 
new law stated that if the ADNR clearly demonstrated an overriding state interest, the 
commissioner could approve a waiver of local planning authority approval and 
requirements relating to compliance with local ordinances and regulations.  The SNG 
leasing program was now equipped with an administrative veto of local planning and 
zoning ordinances.  State regulations extinguished local governments’ oversight rights. 
 
In February 2000 the Division of Oil and Gas began accepting shallow natural gas lease 
applications.  In the first two weeks, 36 applicants applied for a total of 270 leases in the 
state.  In the Mat-Su Borough 162 applications were submitted. Many applications 
overlapped each other.  ADNR drew lots in order to establish priority among the 
applications.  A control number was assigned to each lease application so that an 
application with a higher control number had precedence over applications with a lower 
control number.  Finally, in February 2003, a decision was made regarding the Mat-Su 
lease applications.  Sixty of the applications were issued.  The applications that were 
denied overlapped with approved applications having a higher control number, or there 
turned out to be no available state land in the application area. 
 
The terms of the SNG leases were very favorable to producers.   Because shallow gas 
leases did not allow exploration for oil and gas below 3,000 feet, the lessee was required 
to post a bond of only $25,000 (instead of the $1 million bond required for conventional 
exploratory drilling).   Annual rental payments were set a $1 per acre for the life of the 
lease (rather than increasing to $3 per aces as with conventional oil and gas leases).  And, 
for as long as production continued, the leases were to be  automatically extended – 
which in the case of shallow natural gas production could be anywhere from 20-30 years. 
For a map of the location of SNG leases see Appendix IV. 
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While the non-competitive “over-the-counter” shallow gas program was successful in 
avoiding the tragedy of the commons by getting separate leases into the hands of gas 
producers, the new program was ill-prepared to deal with the firestorm of public 
stakeholder ire which it ignited.   The Alaska split-estate created a situation that enabled 
the private property owners on the surface to block the use of the state-owned subsurface 
commons – a tragedy of the anticommons.   
  
Problems in the Split-Estate: The Tragedy of the 
Anticommons 
 
The over-the-counter SNG program was threatened by the public, undermined by 
politicians, and eventually repealed by the legislature as split-estate conflicts emerged in 
the Alaska owner state.  Whereas conventional Oil and Gas Lease area lease sales largely 
took place in remote unpopulated areas of the state and were for exploration deep below 
the surface, the new shallow natural gas leases were often located in the state’s populated 
areas and were intended for exploration relatively near the surface.  The split-estate land 
ownership regime essentially created a spatial anticommons where the clash between 
surface and subsurface owners prevented SNG resources from being developed. 
 
The Coase Theorem in economics states that given well-defined property rights, 
resources will be used efficiently and identically regardless of who owns them provided 
that the transaction costs to negotiation are low. Unfortunately, in the Alaska owner-state 
where the subsurface mineral rights are owned collectively by the state, there is no single 
owner holding a well-defined bundle of market legal rights.    The state’s attempt to 
establish market rights for the subsurface commons through the new over-the-counter 
SNG lease program ran into difficulty because property rights owners on the surface were   
ignored and largely excluded from shallow natural gas leasing process. 
 
The new SNG program was created outside of the legal anticommons that had been 
established for conventional oil and gas which could have given surface owners veto 
rights over the use of subsurface mineral resources.  The legislature’s preemption of local 
planning and zoning authority over coal-bed methane development  and the absence of a 
Best Interest Finding, gave producers almost free reign to purchase SNG leases wherever 
they wanted.  Public notice was also reduced to a minimum.  Only one day’s notice was 
required in a statewide and a local newspaper, plus a posting on the state agency 
websites.  Before applying to the ADNR for a lease permit,  all the driller was required to 
do was give a copy of the plan of operations to all of the surface owners on whose land 
drilling would occur and post a $25,000 bond . 
 
In the summer of 2003 when ADNR announced that applications had been received for 
shallow gas leases in the Mat-Su Borough, tremendous debate followed.  This was the 
first time that many residents had heard of the existence of shallow gas leases in the 
valley.   When surface property owners found out that they lived on or adjacent to public 
and private lands that had been leased for coal-bed methane development they were 
stunned.   10
 
Property owners in the Mat-Su Valley and Homer were shocked to learn that they did not 
own the subsurface rights to their properties.  The so-called split estate established at the 
time of statehood had allowed those rights to be acquired by resource extraction 
companies who now had a legal right to drill in their backyards.  The new subsurface 
leases were viewed as the first step in implementing operation plans which would 
eventually construct gravel drilling pad, access roads, gates, noisy compressors, pumps, 
metering stations and pipelines – all the things necessary for the development, production 
and marketing of coal-bed methane.   
 
The Executive Director of the Colorado-based Oil and Gas Accountability Project even 
visited Alaska to warn people how coal bed methane gas drilling could adversely impact 
the state.  There were stories of dry or contaminated drinking wells, salt-laced creeks, 
scarred landscapes, denuded wildlife habitat, produced water ( often high in sodium, 
arsenic, and other contaminants) being dumped on the surface and into rivers, 
underground coal fires, and families forced to flee from homes because of methane and 
hydrogen sulfide seeps.  
 
In October 2003, reacting to public pressure, the ADNR Commissioner Tom Irwin halted 
all new shallow gas lease sales and initiated a public process to establish  enforceable 
standards for coal-bed methane development in the Mat-Su Borough.  As he tried to 
diffuse the split-estate conflict, the Commissioner quipped that “coal seams don’t 
understand land ownership patterns.  The following month, Governor Murkowski 
apparently realizing that the citizens in the fastest growing area of the state – the Mat-Su 
Valley – didn’t understand land ownership patterns either, hinted at the possibility of a 
coal bed methane lease buyback.   The Governor told reporters at a press conference in 
Anchorage “if that’s what the people want” then the state could buy back the coal bed 
methane leases and development would be halted. In another part of the state, in 
December 2003, the Kenai Peninsula Borough Assembly voted 6-3 is favor of a lease 
buyback.  They were worried about what the sale of over 22,000 acres of subsurface 
rights in the Homer area might have on the city’s reservoir watershed.  
 
The Anchorage Voice of the Times then opined that the state should ignore the growing 
pressure to buy back leases in both Homer and the Mat-Su Borough.  They argued that a 
new industry for the state should not be thwarted because of the interests of a few surface 
landowners.  They emphasized the need to recognize that surface property owners are not 
the only stakeholders , that the subsurface resources belong all of the people of the state, 
and that the rights of the state as a whole should not be abrogated in favor of the  property 
interests of a few.   At this time, the Governor also clarified his earlier position on CBM 
lease buybacks saying that they were really a last resort.   He stated that he wanted to let 
the DNR finish work on developing guidelines on CBM development and that he was in 
favor of continuing to let companies decide where they want to develop.  He admitted 
that once a company has picked a spot that it says it is profitable to develop, it is not very 
likely that the legislature will appropriate money for a lease buyback.  
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In January and February 2004, the ADNR held public workshops in the Mat-Su Borough 
to help draft enforceable standards for shallow natural gas leasing.  The issues raised by 
the public are perhaps best summarized in the Alaska Property Owner’s Bill of Rights 
(see Appendix V) drafted in March 2004.  The Alaska Property Owner’s Bill of Rights 
proclaimed that coal bed methane development threatened the rights of private property 
owners and that the current state law failed to adequately protect private property owners 
from the threats of coal-bed methane development.  The Bill of Rights demanded that the 
state of Alaska adopt legislation regulating SNG development that included the following 
protections:   
 
 
1)  Property owner consent:  Property owners must have the legal right to say if, 
when, where, and how anyone comes onto their private property to explore, 
develop and/or produce the subsurface mineral estate…. 
2)  Buyback and Moratorium:  The state must buy back all coalbed methane leases 
already let, and halt all further coalbed methane leasing ….. 
3)  Proper Notice:  The state must provide all landowners within five (5) miles of a 
proposed coalbed methane lease ninety (90) days actual written notice before a 
best interest finding process begins. … 
4)  Best Interest Finding: Prior to issuing any leases, the state must conduct a best 
interest finding process to analyze the economic, environmental, and social costs 
and benefits of potential coalbed methane operation, including but not limited to 
the potential diminution in value to private and public properties. 
5)  Baseline Studies & Burden of Proof:  The state must measure baseline water 
quality and quantity in all areas proposed for leasing prior to granting any lese 
application, including all surface and well waters that may be affected… 
6)  Local Control.  The state must ensure local governmental entities have maximum 
powers of self government…. 
7)  Protect Critical Habitat & Recreational Lands:  The state must identify and 
implement “no drill” zones, and prohibit coalbed methane leasing and 
development in sensitive or critical wildlife areas. 
8)  Water protection:  the state must prohibit coalbed methane water extraction in 
groundwater aquifers that are the source of existing or future water wells and 
prohibit the use of toxic hydraulic fracturing fluids. 
9)  Property owner safeguards:  The state must promulgate by December 2004 
enforceable minimum statewide regulations that require best available technology 
and practices to ensure the health and safety of citizens on issues of noise, air and 
water quality, setbacks, use and disposal of any toxics, and surface restoration and 
reclamation.  
10) Competitive Bidding:  In order to maximize the benefit of our natural gas 
resources, the state must re-institute a competitive bidding process for all coalbed 
methane (shallow gas) leases 
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In order to address the issues raised in the Alaska Property Owner’s Bill of Rights, the 
Shallow Natural Gas Program was redesigned by the Alaska Legislature to handle the 
problems of managing a limited-exclusion anticommons.    The reconfiguration of the 
SNG program to deal with stakholders’ rights of exclusion, rather than producers’ rights 
of use  was a necessary first step by the legislature  to avoid future tragedies of the 
anticommons. 
The Limited-Exclusion Anticommons for Shallow Natural 
Gas 
 
In response to heated public debate over the SNG program,   the Alaska Legislature in 
May 2004 passed House Bill No. 531 and repealed the existing over-the-counter shallow 
natural gas leasing program by amending the section of the law under which shallow 
natural gas leases were issued.    The SNG program was placed within the conventional 
competitive leasing and exploration licensing programs which both require the ADNR to 
conduct a Best Interest Finding (BIF) prior to leasing.   The BIF process requires 
extensive public noticing and public input and requires the Commissioner of ADNR to 
balance interests prior to holding a lease sale or issuing an exploration license. The 
ADNR Commissioner’s authority to override local zoning ordinance was also repealed.  
 
With the passage of HB 531 development of coal-bed methane in Alaska ground to a halt.   
Limits were placed on the discretion of ADNR to extend existing shallow gas leases.  
Those with pending shallow gas lease applications were provided an opportunity to 
convert their applications into an application for an exploration license.  The pending 
lease applicants were given a one-time opportunity to apply for a noncompetitive 
exploration license with a Best Interest Finding.   This was especially important to 
Evergreen Resources Inc. which held 300,000 acres of current or pending leases across 
the state, but had not yet produced commercial amounts of methane in Alaska. 
 
The repeal and amendment of the SNG program did not satisfy public interest groups 
from the Mat-Su Borough and Homer.  In July 2004, Friends of Mat-Su and the 
Kachemak Bay Conservation Society filed a lawsuit against the state seeking to void 
more than 160 leases which were approved in 2003.   The suit was trying to accomplish 
what the Governor and the state would not do – buy the leases back (Gay, 2004).  
 
Meanwhile, in August 2004, Evergreen Resources took advantage of the new legislation 
and decided to convert some of their pending shallow natural gas lease application into 
exploration license applications.  However, in September 2004, immediately following 
the announcement of the $2.1 Billion sale of the Denver-based oil and gas company 
Evergreen Resources to the Dallas-based Pioneer Natural Resources Co., Alaska 
Governor Frank Murkowski announced that Pioneer agreed to relinquish interest in 
shallow natural gas leases on 224,000 acres in the Mat-Su Borough which “were obtained 
under the truncated procedures of the Shallow Gas Leasing Act (Murkowski, 2004).”  
This included 74,000 acres formerly held by Evergreen Resources and an additional 
150,000 acres to which it had access.  In addition, Pioneer decided to drop exploration   13
application on 30,000 acres it had recently converted from shallow natural gas lease 
applications.    
 
The legislature moved relatively quickly to repeal the noncompetitive shallow natural gas 
leasing program in the face of mounting public criticism.    However, placing the shallow 
natural gas program under the jurisdiction of the conventional oil and gas program , is not 
likely to be sufficient to avoid the tragedy of the anticommons.    It appears that the scope 
of conflict surrounding the SNG program was so great that the anticommons/private 
boundary will probably have to be moved to expand the anticommons even further.  
Expanding the Limited-Exclusion Anticommons for 
Shallow Natural Gas 
 
The action taken by the Alaska legislature amending the SNG program was the first step 
in defining the legal anticommons which would govern the development of coal-bed 
methane resources: future leases would be put out for competitive bid rather than offered 
over-the-counter; each lease would require a best-interest-finding (BIF); and local 
regulations would no longer be subject to administrative overrule by the ADNR 
Commissioner.  Furthermore, the removal of 100 percent of the leases which were 
secured under the SNG leasing program was expected to substantially reduce anxiety 
among residents and property owners in the Mat-Su Valley (Murkowski, 2004).   Despite 
these significant changes additional steps were necessary to expand the anticommons and 
restore public confidence in the management of coalbed methane resources in the Mat-Su 
Valley.    
 
At the state level, “Enforceable Standards for Development of State Owned Coalbed 
Methane Resources in the Matanuska-Susitna Borough” was released in December 2004 
by the Alaska Department of Natural Resources, Division of Oil and Gas.   The new state 
standards are designed to promote greater public involvement and avoid the mistake of 
the original SNG program which did not include a conventional public hearing process.   
ADNR is now required to provide at least a 30-day public notice and a review/comment 
period for each phase of CBM development (exploration, development and 
transportation).   And, if ADNR finds that a developer’s plan of operation raises new 
issues of significant public interest, then at least a 60-day public notice is required.  
 
Split-estate issues are also specifically addressed in the new enforceable state standards 
for shallow natural gas.  Operators are required to make contact with the surface owner of 
lands upon which activities are proposed and then make good-faith efforts to negotiate a 
surface use agreement.   If an agreement cannot be reached, ADNR (rather than the 
driller) may now initiate damage bond proceedings.  Damage bond coverage has also 
been expanded to include loss of the use of property during operations, potential costs of 
damage to existing surface improvements, crops, and time.   Finally, ANDR plans to 
develop an informational Split-Estate brochure which will include discussion of: the right 
of access to the subsurface estate; surface owner rights; and general provisions of a 
surface-use agreement. 
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At the local level, the Mat-Su Borough passed stricter rules regulating shallow natural gas 
development than those promulgated by the ADNR Division of Oil and Gas.  The goal of 
the hundreds of  Mat-Su Valley residents who turned out to testify in favor of tough 
borough ordinances  was to “contain another potential boom” that might arise from 
another search for coal bed methane in the Mat-Su Borough (Hollander, 2004).  The need 
to keep SNG development away from populated areas was stressed.  The new ordinances 
call for quarter-mile setbacks for drill pad and compressor stations from homes and 
school (state standards call for a 500 feet setback, but 1500 feet for noisy compressors).   
Drilling is completely banned in areas with a least one home per acre and limits are 
placed on the number of wells companies can drill.  
 
Local borough government is looked upon as the last resort for curbing development 
amidst a confusing array of regulations at the state and federal levels.  As the president of 
the board of the non-profit Friends of Mat-Su explained, “rather than reform the 
regulatory snarl over split-estate ownership, the new [state] standards complicate it.  With 
federal, state, borough and several types of private owners holding rights to subsurface 
resources, it’s nearly impossible to determine who regulates what (Whittington-Evans, 
2005).”   This observation reflects the vast scope and complexity of the expanded legal 
anticommons which now governs the exploration and development SNG resources in 
Alaska. 
 
Conclusion: 
 
The conventional wisdom regarding the tragedy of the anticommons is that resource 
underuse results from putting too many rights of exclusion into the anticommons.  
Multiple owners of the same resource, each with the right veto each other’s use of the 
resource creates the anticommons dynamic of underuse.  The mantra for solving the 
tragedy of the anticommons has always been to create a system of private user rights. 
 
This study of shallow natural gas leasing in Alaska, reframes the tragedy of the 
anticommons by suggesting that resource underuse may also result from taking rights of 
exclusion out of the anticommons.  The notion is that government manages the commons 
by creating legal anticommons which ensures public involvement in resource-use 
decisions by giving multiple stakeholders exclusion rights defined by government rules 
and regulations.  From this perspective, the solution to the tragedy of the anticommons is 
not private user rights, but an effective system of public-private collaboration.   We are 
reminded that Hardin’s solution to the tragedy of the commons was “mutual coercion, 
mutually agreed upon.”  Many of the problems that the Shallow Natural Gas (SNG) 
leasing program encountered stemmed not from mutual action but rather from unilateral 
action by the state to take rights of exclusion out of the Alaska anticommons. This 
unleashed an anticommons dynamic which forced private industry to eventually give 
back their coalbed methane leases to the state.   The excluded stakeholders (surface 
property owners, public interest groups and local governments) successfully exercised 
their political clout to get their rights of exclusion put back into the anticommons.  Now   15
there is an even larger legal anticommons than there was before which will make it even 
harder to develop shallow natural gas in Alaska in the future. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Value symmetry: commons and anticommons 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Buchanan, James M., and Yoon, Yon J.  2000.  “Symmetric Tragedies:  
Commons and Anticommons.” The Journal of Law & Economics 43 : 8 
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APPENDIX II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Distinction between Private and Anticommons Property 
 
 
On the left, the private property regime is characterized by vertical lines separating 
core rights in objects.  Owner A is initially endowed with a core bundle of rights in 
object 1, owner B gets object 2, and owner C get object 3. 
 
On the right, the anticommons property regime is characterized by horizontal lines 
separating rights of exclusion in each object.   Owners A, B, and C are initially 
endowed with rights of exclusion in objects 1,2, 3 
 
In a spatial anticommons, the horizontal lines demarcate the physical subdivisions of 
an object.  Each anticommons owner receives a core bundle of rights, but in too 
little space for the most efficient use in the given time and place.   
 
In a legal anticommons, the horizontal lines demarcate core rights of exclusion held 
by different owners.   
 
Source:  Heller, Michael A. 1998.  “The Tragedy of the Anticommons:  Property in the 
Transition from Marx to Markets.”  Harvard Law Review 111: 670-671 
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APPENDIX III 
 
Areawide Leasing  
 
 
 
 
Source:  Alaska Division of Natural Resources, Division of Oil and Gas 2004, 2-2 
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APPENDIX IV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Alaska Department of Natural Resources, Division of Oil and Gas, Five-
Year Oil and Gas Leasing Program, March 2004. p. 15 
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